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ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 1 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN

(India)

GE.69-7581

69-35318

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. KLUSAK
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. SAFAR
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. R. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M. TELLO
Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK
Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEFOSZ
Mr. R. WLAZLO

Romania:

Mr. N. ECODESCO
Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCO
Mr. V. TARZIORU
Mr. C. MITRAN

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. T. BENGTSON
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHEIN
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. N.S. KILSHILOV
Mr. V.A. USTINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. ISMAIL

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
Mr. M.E. HOWELL

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. C. GLEYSTEN
Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. T.S. WILKINSON

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

1. The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the 399th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Since our last meeting we have all heard the sad news of the passing away of one of the greatest personalities of our time, General Eisenhower. Glowing tributes have been paid all over the world to him and to his memory. I should say here that he was a great soldier, an outstanding statesman noted for his gift of reconciliation of men and affairs, a world leader and, above all, a great American. His pronouncements on disarmament -- a task with which this Committee is charged -- were always inspiring in their nobility of purpose and intent, breadth of vision and far-sightedness in the interest of the future of all humanity.
3. It would therefore be fit and proper that all of us -- and I hope I have the permission of all members of the Committee to speak on their behalf -- should pay homage to and honour the memory of this great man by observing one minute's silence and by requesting our colleague Ambassador Fisher, the representative of the United States of America, to convey to Mrs. Eisenhower and other members of the family our deepest condolences and sympathy upon their great loss -- a loss, indeed, not only for the family of the departed leader and the American people but also for the whole world.
4. May I now request that all those present in this Chamber rise and observe one minute's silence.

The representatives, standing, observed one minute's silence.

5. Mr. FISHER (United States of America): On behalf of my Government I should like to acknowledge with sincere thanks the condolences and sympathy expressed this morning by you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of all the members of this Conference with respect to the death last Friday of our former President, Dwight David Eisenhower. I shall, of course, convey to Mrs. Eisenhower and to the other members of the family your expressions of condolence and sympathy. I know they will appreciate them. Thank you very much.
6. The CHAIRMAN (India): Before I proceed to call upon the speakers on my list I should like to take this opportunity of welcoming Ambassador Fisher among us once again. We are very glad to see him back in order to deliberate with us on the important issues which now face this Conference.

7. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): After seven relatively lean years it is necessary for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to step up its rate of production. I am planning to draw attention today to one subject on which, in the view of my delegation, progress is most urgent, namely the comprehensive test ban. I am returning to this issue, although in session after session my delegation and others have been contributing concrete suggestions in order to facilitate agreement, only to see them turned down by the main Powers. The subject is, however, too vital to be left aside only because earlier attempts at solutions have not been successful.
8. As I pointed out in my previous intervention in the Committee (ENDC/397, para.97) we have an urgent mandate from the General Assembly of the United Nations to elaborate a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests (resolution 2455 (XXIII); ENDC/237). In our agreed agenda of August last year (ENDC/236, p.3) such a treaty is placed under the heading with the highest priority. It would be shirking our clear responsibilities if we did not devote a major proportion of the time available to trying finally to complete the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) which, as we all know and as its own preamble admits, was meant to be but a step towards a comprehensive test ban.
9. Work on a complete test ban must proceed hand in hand with the negotiations on limiting strategic nuclear-weapon systems. Having already been so well prepared in its technical aspects, the test ban ought in fact to proceed somewhat in advance of the major decision. Securing such a ban would considerably alleviate some of the control problems connected with that other agreement: hardly, of course, with that part of it concerned with freezing the deployment of the weapon systems concerned, but certainly with limiting further developing of the weapons themselves.
10. Many of the test shots now resounding throughout the globe are signs of development work -- for instance, on so-called "penetration aids", on combinations of multiple independently targeted missiles and on other offensive-weapon systems. It should be self-evident that if the test activity, which is now being recorded by us or by others, were made non-existent by a comprehensive test ban the confidence that new weapon developments were not to surprise the world would be immensely enhanced. That no ban ensures one hundred per cent security is another matter, a weakness of a kind that we seem to have to live with in all human affairs.
11. In this connexion one other matter must be mentioned, namely, the obviously increasing frequency of radioactive leakages from underground tests, also across borders. When such radioactive debris has fallen over my country we have reacted, and shall

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continue to react, by notifying the government concerned. It seems that other such leakages occur elsewhere. In reality they constitute violations of the Moscow Treaty. However insignificant in radioactive yield and however technical in nature these violations have been so far, all signatories of the Moscow Treaty must be alert so as not by passivity to seem to condone explosions that result in leakages. This issue will take on greater practical significance in relation to the so-called peaceful explosions. Even when such projects may appear enticing they should not be allowed to proceed if they endanger an absolute adherence to international obligations. This matter, in reality, constitutes yet another reason for establishing a water-tight, comprehensive ban also covering underground nuclear explosions and for providing, in a separate international agreement, for some form of international licensing of exceptions in the case of certain explosions of recognized peaceful value.

12. In the past, the attempts on the part of most delegations at solutions of the underground test-ban problem have been concentrated on the control issue. It was felt that if only a satisfactory solution were found in the matter of verification, a treaty prohibiting the underground nuclear tests would be easily achieved. It is my strong conviction, in spite of assertions to the contrary by some Powers, that the technical control issue cannot be regarded as the decisive problem. The crux is political.

13. The prospects are, however, now becoming brighter for completing the test ban, as such a ban will be a very desirable part of the arrangements needed to maintain the strategic arms limitation which we hope is about to be negotiated. This political necessity should provide enough political momentum to produce the political concessions by the nuclear-weapon Powers which are required to achieve agreement on the test ban and to establish a viable control system. For the non-nuclear-weapon States, adherence to a comprehensive test ban as well as to the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) would mean placing a double lock on their undertaking to remain nuclear-weapon-free!

14. In order to be able to advocate properly the political concessions required I shall first, as briefly as possible, remind the Committee of the impressive increase in recent years of our understanding of the possibilities of seismological methods to monitor a ban on underground nuclear explosions, an understanding that has been obtained from the international scientific community through individual work in several countries and through joint discussions in various forums.

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15. In 1967 the Swedish delegation initiated a renewed discussion of the technical and political aspects of the underground test ban control issue by advancing an analysis, by decision theory, of the seismological identification methods available. I am referring to document TNDC/PV.309. A description of this analysis was given in the Swedish memorandum of 19 July 1967 (TNDC/191) and further explanations were proffered by us in the ensuing debate (TNDC/PV.315 and 323) in which the United States (TNDC/PV.312 and 320), the United Kingdom (TNDC/PV.319) and Canada (TNDC/PV.332) offered further technical arguments. In February 1968 the Swedish Defence Research Institute distributed a report containing a detailed description of our scientific analysis and the results so far obtained.

16. It is important to note that the purpose of test ban control was envisaged by us not as having the intelligence aim of obtaining complete information or the aim of providing judicially conclusive evidence but rather as having the aim of deterring a prospective violator from concealed testing by presenting him with a sufficient probability of being exposed.

17. This purpose entailed exploitation of the statistical properties of the seismological identification criteria in order to determine in advance a "decision level", as it is called, at which a seismic event had to be acted upon politically either as an earthquake or as an explosion. In this process it becomes inevitable to strike a compromise assuring, on the one hand, a sufficient probability to make correct decisions about explosions and, on the other hand, a sufficient probability of avoiding false alarms about earthquakes.

18. We then submitted to analysis first the case in which control would rely on obligatory inspections. Application of this analysis to data then published about seismological identification methods showed that what appeared to us to be a satisfactory deterrence could be obtained with far fewer inspections per year than earlier suggested, in the order of one inspection per year.

19. Next, it was revealed that such a deterrence effect could be available also by using control without obligatory inspections, if one allowed for a certain rate of false alarms, fewer than one in ten years. Such false alarms, which may lead to an

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unjustified accusation, are impossible to exclude in connexion with seismological test ban control. But the solution of the practical problem in the case of control without obligatory inspections consists in making the false alarms extremely rare occurrences. For those occasions the control procedure of the treaty should provide ways for the accused Party to clear himself, including the possibility, as envisaged in our scheme for verification-by-challenge (ENDC/PV.247, pp.13-23), to invite an on-site inspection.

20. From the discussions in 1967 and 1968 it appeared that the main limitation of our proposal was that it did not cover the so-called "magnitude gap" between 4.5 and 4. I am referring specifically to the statement by the United States representative contained in document ENDC/PV.320, paras. 57 et seq. This range is usually thought to comprise explosions in hard rock of yields from some 10-20 kilotons down to about one kiloton. In this range, long-distance seismological methods, which would be able efficiently to identify explosions and earthquakes, were lacking.

21. In 1968 there was a new turn of events. Some of the outstanding issues were discussed at a meeting of scientists from several countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union and France. A summary report from this meeting, convened by the Stockholm International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI), has been circulated as document ENDC/230 and has been quoted many times by several delegations here.

22. The SIPRI study concerns itself only with the seismological conditions for controlling a test ban without obligatory inspections, termed "detection and identification by seismological means only". It states that the so-called world-wide standard seismic network of conventional seismographic stations separates clearly the waves from explosions in granite with yields down to 20-60 kilotons from those generated by earthquakes. This corresponds roughly to the upper end of the magnitude gap I have just mentioned, and the summary report goes on to say that British, Canadian, American and Soviet research indicates separation possibilities well down into the magnitude gap.

23. We note that these summary conclusions are consistent with an essential part of our own earlier conclusions.

24. In this Committee the political reactions to the unanimous scientific conclusions in the SIPRI summary report were not unanimous. The representative of the Soviet Union Ambassador Roshchin, said in his statement on 1 August 1968:

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"Given modern national seismic instruments, practically no country can carry out an underground nuclear-weapon explosion secretly without incurring the risk of being exposed as a violator of an important international agreement.

The only thing needed to reach agreement on the cessation of underground nuclear-weapon tests is a political decision by governments ..." (ENDC/PV.386, para. 57)

Already in his statement on 16 July 1968 the Soviet representative had said:

"The Soviet Government is ready to come to an agreement immediately on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests on the basis of using national means of detection for control over this prohibition." (ENDC/PV.381, para. 32)

25. In his statement to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 5 December 1968 the representative of the United States, Ambassador Foster, said that the technical inability to distinguish at long distances between explosions and earthquakes in ranges of fairly low yields but with great military significance could not be dismissed, "no matter how much some might value the political advantages of doing so" (A/C.1/PV.1630, provisional, p. 16). In the letter from President Nixon to the United States representative read out by Ambassador Smith at the opening meeting of our Committee this year it is said that:

"... the United States supports the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban adequately verified. In view of the fact that differences regarding verification have not permitted achievement of this key arms control measure, efforts must be made towards greater understanding of the verification issue." (ENDC/239,* p.2)

26. The decision as to what constitutes "adequate" verification is certainly ultimately a political decision even if it ought to be made on the basis of extensive scientific and technical considerations. In our theoretical approach to the control question, as referred to above, we made this quite clear.

27. One may now ask whether the technical possibilities can be improved in the foreseeable future or not. I shall certainly not enter into any detailed predictions as to what scientific and technological advances will be forthcoming. However, already at the stage of last summer's meeting of scientific experts, as described in the full report of the Stockholm International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, several promising roads to improvement were pointed out, such as by further exploitation of the depth at which an event takes place, by the sense of first motion recorded, by frequency content in seismic waves, by excitation of shear

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waves, by complexity, by improved methods of surface wave detection, by more study of the relative excitation of surface and body waves by earthquakes and explosions, by applying the methods of pattern recognition to earthquakes and by statistical treatment of identification criteria for decision applications.

28. Apart from that quite promising list, I should like to point out that the SIPRI study did not take into account at all the very powerful array stations already existing or soon coming into service. They should provide a considerable improvement in capabilities for teleseismic identification. My country expects to get a smaller station of this kind into service in the near future as a modest contribution to the research capabilities in this field.

29. The SIPRI report concerned itself a great deal with identification by comparison of long surface waves and short body waves, the former running along the surface of the earth and the latter through the deep interior of the earth, and it was on the basis of this method that the above-mentioned summary conclusion about the 20-60 kiloton limit for clear separation was drawn. I have been advised that a closer investigation of these data as presented at the SIPRI meeting -- closer than was possible during the short time available to the meeting -- shows great differences between the results obtained by different investigations, apparently dependent on where the events took place, where the observations were made and what instruments were employed. The very difference between the United States and the Soviet type of instrumentation seems to play an important and confusing role.

30. We hope that this matter will be investigated in detail by the utilization in direct comparison of both types of instruments. Some of the data in the SIPRI report when extrapolated, showed very promising capabilities of covering the above-mentioned magnitude gap. I understand that the sensitivity of this identification method is much improved when the distance between observatory and event is decreased. This makes measurements at regional and local distances very important in comparison with measurements at teleseismic distances, on which most of the emphasis of the discussion on test-ban control techniques has been placed in recent years.

31. Practical gains of considerable value could be derived from improvements in regard to properly located stations of the classical, or anyway some fairly simple, model, as was also recommended in the SIPRI report. Regional and local data could also be obtained by the use of some variety of automatic and sealed stations, as has

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been discussed earlier in this Committee. Other gains of great practical value would be won from the use of an efficient data exchange, as proposed by us repeatedly since 1965, transmitting the required regional and local data to other countries. It would seem that the impressive development of communication via satellites might be useful for the distribution of data from these stations.

32. Both those measures -- more stations and more data exchange -- would very quickly entail, I think, a large improvement in the present control capabilities. They would constitute a practical infrastructure for the scientific analysis going forward. Financially the improvement of verification possibilities would be an unimportant matter compared to the cost of nuclear-weapon testing.

33. All this being said, I want to stress that a decision on the test ban need not wait for the completion of technical studies and installations.

34. After having been so specific and having given in such detail our estimate of the scientific and technical situation, I hope that my fellow representatives will excuse me if I repeat that I find it difficult to accept the thesis that remaining uncertainties in this field can constitute sufficient reason why the Committee has not been able so far to present to the world the text of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. No, the reason is simply, I am convinced, that the political will to agree has been lacking, in spite of all the assurances to the contrary that we have heard both in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations. Of course, I do not underestimate the reasons behind this apparent lack of readiness to act. Military demands for continuation of tests are obviously going to be maintained as long as the super-Powers fail to initiate and vigorously pursue the bilateral discussions on a limitation of nuclear weapon systems. The reluctance to give up testing of nuclear explosives may also be connected with the much-publicized expectations as to the utilization of such explosions for peaceful purposes. A further factor for not closing down facilities for development of new weapon models may be fear of a future destabilization of the military balance, due to the emergence of important nuclear weapon capabilities in States which do not take part in the international disarmament negotiations.

35. This, however, can clearly not account for more than a minor part of the activities going on in the field of underground testing; the techniques -- even if

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operationally kept in mothballs -- will not be obliterated from the fund of knowledge already built up. Consequently, none of the factors enumerated should be sufficient reason for the super-Powers, with their terrifying capacity to annihilate each other and, theoretically, to "overkill" all humanity, not to come soon to an agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

36. I would suggest that new methods to probe the readiness of the main Powers to come to a solution should now be tested. One such method would be for some delegation to put forward a complete structure of a treaty text. Someone may say that this is not proper, that in the past such initiatives have always been left to one or both of our co-Chairmen. To such a critic I should like to answer that for years now we have been waiting for such an initiative on this item, but that none has been forthcoming -- and we all share the responsibility for action.

37. After having had a number of private consultations with other delegations, my delegation therefore is today taking the unusual step of putting forward a working paper (ENDC/242) in which suggestions as to the contents of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests are reproduced. The title of the paper should give an indication of the modesty with which this is being done. I must underline that we do not wish to bind any delegation -- not even our own -- to any particular wording of the various articles. For most parts of the text we have found it expedient to use more or less the same language as in some of the existing disarmament treaties. We shall, however, greatly welcome suggestions as to any other wording which would be more technically adequate and which could be more speedily accepted.

38. The main purpose of our action today is to ensure that the deliberations on this vital subject are made more specific, and to give an incitement to the co-Chairmen to present their views.

39. Let me briefly present the text of our paper, which is now before the Committee. As I have said, we have followed the general principle of using, whenever possible, the language of existing multilateral treaties in the disarmament field, chiefly the partial test ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty, as a pattern for the provisions in this text. Members will thus find in the preamble several paragraphs which have been taken out of the non-proliferation Treaty. One of its paragraphs has been taken from the joint memorandum on the test ban put forward by the eight non-aligned delegations in 1966 (ENDC/177).

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40. Looking at the substantive parts of our proposed draft, we see that paragraphs 1 and 2 of article I are in essence identical with the corresponding provisions of the partial test ban Treaty. Consequently, all underground nuclear explosions are forbidden. In paragraph 3 of article I there is a reference to a possibility to exempt from the total ban peaceful explosions if carried out in conformity with a special international agreement to be negotiated separately. This article is therefore in complete harmony with the non-proliferation Treaty, where a similar provision concerning peaceful explosions is to be found in its article V.

41. Article II contains the crucial provisions on control. It consists of four paragraphs. In the first, the parties undertake in a general manner to co-operate in good faith to ensure the implementation of the treaty. In the second, all parties pledge themselves to co-operate in an effective international exchange of seismological data --- an idea for co-operation between national networks supported so many times here and in the United Nations by a vast majority of States. In the third paragraph a series of measures are set out, intended to lead to clarification of uncertain underground events. The individual measures form parts of a step-wise system, which we think will give all parties a sufficient degree of confidence in its applicability. The measures are

- (a) the right to make inquiries and receive information as a result of such inquiries;
- (b) the right to invite inspection on one's territory in a manner prescribed by the inviting party;
- (c) the right to make proposals as to suitable methods of further clarification.

The measures under (a) and (b) are intended to enable a suspected government to free itself of suspicions. This possibility has to be seen in the light of the extreme rarity of such occasions -- as I indicated earlier, fewer than one in ten years, according to our estimate. The procedure under (c) leaves open other possibilities of action if a party deems that the earlier measures have not been sufficient. This corresponds to a sequence of simple rules, reflecting a procedure which seems normal in all cases of contested evidence and which we have sometimes called "verification by challenge". The fourth paragraph of article II enables any party which has not been convinced by these methods of the nature of a particular event to bring the matter before the Security Council and the other parties to the treaty.

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42. This whole procedure, together with the provisions in article V regarding withdrawal from the treaty, which are identical with those in the partial test ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty, constitutes, as we see it, a balanced set of rules which will prevent parties from trying to conduct any tests secretly.

43. The main features of article III, concerning amendments, are taken from the non-proliferation Treaty.

44. Article IV contains rules on signature, ratification, entry into force and registration. It utilizes in essence the same language as article IX of the non-proliferation Treaty. We have left open at present the names of the depositary governments and the number of ratifications, in addition to those of the depositary governments, needed to bring the treaty into force.

45. Article V indicates that the treaty should be of unlimited duration. Of the provision in the same article regarding the right of withdrawal I have already spoken.

46. The last article, article VI, contains the usual provisions regarding languages and deposition.

47. I shall not go any further in my intervention today. Let me conclude by repeating that our main purpose has been to make the debate come more to the point. We invite all other delegations to express their views, to support, to supplement or, as the case may be, to criticize. A full and detailed discussion is needed, and that as soon as possible. It goes without saying that the participation in such a debate of the delegations of the nuclear-weapon Powers is particularly important. But, as I have already stated, we cannot just wait. The multitude of nations desiring progress in regard to nuclear disarmament does not allow us to remain passive.

48. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): Before I begin my intervention I should like to associate myself with the words of welcome addressed by the speakers who have preceded me in the course of this session to our new co-Chairman, the representative of the United States, Ambassador Smith, and to the new representatives of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Klusák; of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff; and of Brazil, Ambassador Frazão. I should also like to welcome Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, who is back with us after an interval of more than a year.

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49. Poland, which this year celebrates the twenty-fifth anniversary of its liberation after the terrible and devastating Nazi aggression and occupation, is a country particularly interested in any progress towards strengthening peace and enhancing the security of all nations, large and small alike. We realize that the best way to ensure full security for all countries leads through the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. That is our ultimate goal. But until that goal is attained we must explore every possibility and examine every measure that might strengthen confidence among nations and mark progress on the road, certainly neither short nor easy, towards the attainment of our ultimate objective. That is why Poland has supported such steps and measures and, as is well known, has put forward a number of proposals of its own. I shall come back to this question in the course of my statement.

50. At the last session of this Committee the Polish delegation stressed the importance of the successful completion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). The debate at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly on the report submitted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/236) confirmed that the non-proliferation Treaty continues to receive the overwhelming support of the United Nations membership and is rightly considered as a very important factor conducive to the restriction and curtailment of the ever increasing nuclear armaments race. The Treaty has thus far been signed by about ninety States and ratified by ten. That is evidence that slow but steady progress is being made towards its entry into force.

51. Poland, which actively participated in the elaboration of the Treaty and was among the first States to sign it, has already started the procedure for its ratification. We attach great importance to the earliest possible implementation of the Treaty, being convinced that this would open new possibilities for further disarmament measures and speed up the prospects for new agreements in this field. However, to be fully effective the Treaty must be signed, ratified and faithfully observed by all countries, and in particular by those with advanced possibilities for producing nuclear weapons. We are sincerely interested in the universal implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. However, because of its geographical situation and historical experience Poland is particularly concerned with the developments in Europe, and especially in Central Europe.

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52. In this connexion I should like to draw the attention of this Conference to the fact that among the European countries most advanced in the possibilities of producing nuclear weapons only one has not signed the Treaty. That obviously means that that particular State wants to ensure for itself at least a possibility of procuring nuclear weapons and is trying to use the Treaty as an object for gaining political and military concessions. When such an attitude is adopted by a State which does not recognize the post-war realities in Europe, a State that obstinately refuses to accept the existing frontiers and strives at their revision, this must cause serious concern, and it casts well-founded doubts on the sincerity of some allegedly peaceful declarations of the Government of that country.

53. The Appeal of the Conference of the States-Parties to the Warsaw Pact, issued on 17 March in Budapest, states that

"One of the basic pre-conditions for safeguarding the security of Europe is the inviolability of the existing European frontiers, including the Odra-Nysa frontiers, and those between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal German Republic, recognition of the fact of the existence of those two countries, renunciation by the latter of its claims to represent the whole of the German people, and renunciation of possession in any form of nuclear weapons." ^{1/}

54. If we accept, as I believe we all do, that progress in the field of disarmament has become a matter of life or death for mankind as a whole, we must also agree that attempts to undermine the non-proliferation Treaty must and can be stopped by a determined and united effort. Provided that all governments represented at this Conference show the same singleness of purpose, I am convinced that the chances to continue negotiations in good faith on the foundation laid down by the non-proliferation Treaty and the possibilities of further progress will not be lost.

55. Turning to our agenda (ENDC/236, p.3), I should like to stress that it is the considered view of the Polish delegation that the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would constitute a logical step deriving from the non-proliferation Treaty.

^{1/} The appeal by the States members of the Warsaw Pact was later reproduced as document ENDC/243.

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As may be recalled, the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly a draft convention (A/6834) which was based on the main principles of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), adopted on the initiative of Ethiopia. We discussed the matter at our session last summer, as a result of which it was given high priority among the items under the first point of our agenda, namely, that dealing with nuclear disarmament. There are many arguments -- moral, political, legal, economic and others -- which support the necessity of banning the use of nuclear weapons. My delegation intends to elaborate further on this question in the course of the session.

56. If the momentum generated by the non-proliferation Treaty is not to be lost, we should move rapidly, along with the discussions on banning the use of nuclear weapons, towards the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting the underground testing of such weapons. In our judgement the continued viability of the non-proliferation Treaty is vitally linked with reaching agreement on those two extremely important problems. We are convinced that progress achieved in those areas would open the way for fruitful negotiations on other measures, such as the reduction and elimination of nuclear stockpiles, and so forth. The practical and psychological effects of such measures could be very great, especially in providing additional security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

57. It stems from what has been said so far that our priorities are the same as those endorsed by the recent session of the General Assembly, which adopted, without any opposing vote, two resolutions urging the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to make speedy progress in the nuclear disarmament field. I am referring to resolution 2454 B (XXIII) (ENDC/237) on the question of general and complete disarmament and resolution 2455 (XXIII) (ibid.) on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

58. Progress in seismology detection and identification has reached a point where there is growing confidence that the faithful observance of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests does not require any system of inspection on the spot. This matter has been brilliantly dealt with by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in the statement she has just made. We shall study very carefully the working paper submitted by the Swedish delegation this morning (ENDC/242). The evaluation made by the "detection club" of prospects for seismic detection is of very great importance. I am glad to mention that Polish scientists co-operate in the framework of the

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"detection club". I should like to stress, however, that what has been achieved so far should be primarily ascribed to the continuous and devoted efforts of Swedish scientists, under the wise inspiration of their Government. It seems clearer than ever that what is required now is international acceptance of the principle of a total test ban. In other words, there is need for a political decision.

59. In Poland we welcomed the non-proliferation Treaty not only because of the advance it represents towards international security and further extension of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by virtue of the commitment it contains in article VI for the achievement of further measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, but also because its article VII is quite explicit in asserting that the priority of nuclear disarmament applies also to disarmament efforts pursued on a regional scale. That is why we must seek ways and means of regional disarmament in various parts of the world, but most particularly in Europe, where, as a result of the existence of the two opposing most powerful military alliances with large stockpiles of sophisticated nuclear weapons, the consequences of a possible armed conflict would be the most disastrous. That is why Poland has submitted a number of concrete proposals whose implementation would contribute to the reduction of the danger of an armed conflict in Europe and to the strengthening of the climate of confidence and would thus create favourable conditions for setting up a system of European security and co-operation.

60. Since Poland made its proposal in 1957 (A/PV.697, para.136) to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, the concept of nuclear-free areas has made gradual progress and has become one of the main topics in disarmament discussions. From uninhabited areas such as the Antarctic and outer space, the idea materialized in Latin America, a region of dense population. We believe that the time has come to tackle this problem in Europe. The working paper on the establishment of nuclear-free zones presented here by the representative of Mexico (ENDC/241) is certainly helpful in this respect. We are confident that early implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty would lead to much more auspicious conditions for measures of nuclear disarmament in Europe. The creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe could, as Poland proposed in 1963, be preceded by freezing nuclear armaments in the respective areas. Continuing its persistent peaceful efforts, Poland submitted a proposal to the United Nations General Assembly in 1964 for an all-European conference on security and co-operation. That proposal, later developed in the Bucharest Declaration of 1966, has been brought

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up to date and is now contained in the above-mentioned Appeal to the European States adopted by the Conference of the Warsaw Pact countries in Budapest on 17 March. I should like to draw the attention of members of this Committee to the necessity, stressed by this document which is so timely and important, to turn from general declarations about peace to concrete action conducive to the relaxation of tension and to disarmament.

61. Before I leave the area of nuclear disarmament, may I recall that Poland was among the delegations which in the General Assembly warmly supported the appeal to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to enter at an early date into the already announced bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles (resolution 2456 D (XXIII); ENDC/237). Let me then join the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, and the speakers who have preceded me in this debate, in expressing the hope that the two Powers will soon start their talks and that the progress of their negotiations will favourably influence the cause of disarmament in general.

62. Regarding other items on our agenda, I should like to say a few words on the question of the preservation for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor and on how at this stage we view the problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

63. In the preamble to resolution 2467 A (XXIII) establishing a standing Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, the General Assembly, inter alia, reaffirmed the objectives of its resolution 2340 (XXII), which recognized that it is in the interest of mankind as a whole to favour "... the exploration and use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, ..." beyond the limits of national jurisdiction for peaceful purposes.

64. The messages to this Committee from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin (ENDC/238), the President of the United States, Mr. Nixon (ENDC/239*), and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant (ENDC/PV.395, para.4), all stress the topicality of this question. I think that all members of this Committee recognize that we should give serious consideration to the matter with a view to reaching agreement speedily.

65. In my opinion the initiative of the Soviet delegation, on the instruction of the Soviet Government, in putting forward a draft treaty (ENDC/240) is but a prompt

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response to general expectations of concrete discussions and a speedy agreement to exclude the sea-bed and ocean floor from the armaments race. We wish to join the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal (ENDC/PV.397, para.101), in complimenting the delegation of the Soviet Union on this initiative and on the care with which its text has been elaborated.

66. By proposing a ban on all military installations on the sea-bed and ocean floor the Soviet draft rightly reflects the spirit in which this item was discussed in the United Nations. The very title of this item in the United Nations leaves no room for interpretation. In our view, any restriction of the scope of the proposed arrangement would be an unforgivable mistake. We have heard here that setting up an effective system of verification is extremely difficult. We agree that this is not an easy matter, but that should not lead us away from a very well-defined and noble goal. After all, in my opinion, verification cannot replace the aim for which we are striving. Let me then repeat once again after the representative of Sweden that "We cannot afford to give free course to a new arms race on the sea-bed, or even any more time for planning it." (ibid., para.102) The Polish delegation is carefully studying the proposed draft treaty. We shall return to this question in detail at a later stage of our discussions.

67. Turning now to the question of chemical and bacteriological warfare, I am gratified to note the high evaluation made here by Ambassador Ignatieff on 20 March (ENDC/PV.396, para.63) of the co-operation between the Canadian and the Polish delegations at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly when they negotiated the terms of a mutually acceptable draft resolution which later enjoyed the sponsorship of six other members of this Committee and was finally adopted almost unanimously by the General Assembly. I am referring to resolution 2454 A (XXIII) by which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts, a report on the effects of the possible use of bacteriological and chemical means of warfare. Like several other members of this Committee whose Governments have nominated experts for that group, the Polish Government was pleased to respond to the Secretary-General's request that a Polish scientist be nominated as a member of the group of experts. As we all know, the group met in Geneva in January, and its next meeting is scheduled, I believe, for the middle of April. We are confident that the experts will succeed in finishing their work in time to enable the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit the report to this Committee during its summer session.

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68. In the course of the preceding discussions on the question of bacteriological and chemical weapons both in the United Nations General Assembly and in this Committee the Polish delegation has always spoken in favour of strengthening the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by securing universal adherence to it and strict observance of it. We believe that the report of the Secretary-General will give an authoritatively agreed clarification as to the widest possible interpretation of the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol in regard to B and C means of warfare. That is why we see no reason for the Committee to embark on the discussion of elements of clarification or terminology, as suggested by some representatives, until the report is ready and has been submitted to us officially by the Secretary-General.

69. Mr. KLUSAK (Czechoslovakia): May I at the beginning of my statement identify myself with those representatives who have pointed out at our previous meetings the necessity for achieving concrete results in our Committee's work, which will be a continuation and a substantial expansion of the impulse given by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). We still find ourselves at the very beginning of a long and arduous journey. Unless we hurry we shall expose ourselves to the danger of not getting beyond the stage of good intentions. The stopwatch inexorably measuring our race against time has been set in motion.

70. We have been negotiating on disarmament for years while the production of armaments has been getting into full swing. Expenditure on armaments -- and this has been noted in our Committee -- keeps increasing steadily. The vicious spiral of astronomical military expenditure keeps taking ever more rapid turns in the budgets of the majority of States. The statement which the recently deceased former President of the United States, General Dwight Eisenhower, made in 1953 comes involuntarily to my mind. He truthfully noted that "This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its labourers, the genius of its scientists, the hope of its children." I cannot help thinking of the growth in the military expenditure of individual countries which has taken place since that time. It is shocking and at the same time alarming to have to take note of the fact that as a consequence of armament and conflicts mankind is estimated to have lost in the post-war period -- the so-called peaceful period -- at least as much material wealth as if it had been through another world war. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of people have lost their lives or their health.

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71. At the same time, the development of international relations in the world appears to be moving along a curve leading to increased rather than reduced tension. Even now in various parts of the world a number of dangerous and persistent military conflicts are taking place, and the efforts to end and settle them by peaceful means have not yet yielded any positive results.

72. I recall those well-known facts in order to show how pressed for time we are, how we are being pushed constantly into a blind alley offering no way out unless a fundamental turn takes place in time. I believe that the facts speak in plain language, spurring us on more than clearly to take decisions which would halt and gradually reverse the trend leading to tragic consequences for all humanity.

73. The Czechoslovak Government, aware of its responsibilities to its people, has been sincerely striving to contribute to the solution of acute questions relating to the disarmament programme. That is why the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with other countries, pushed from the outset for a ban on any proliferation of nuclear arms to the States not as yet possessing them. My country was among the first signatories of the well-known document whose text was agreed upon in this room just a year ago. In this connexion, I cannot pass over the assessment made by the representative of Italy -- the Deputy Foreign Minister of that country, Mr. Zagari -- who, like other representatives in this Committee, expressed the importance and role of that document by calling it "historic" (ENDC/PV.397, para. 53).

74. Nevertheless, we realize that our self-satisfaction over the conclusion of that Treaty, however important the Treaty may be, is not sufficient. We realize that it will not suffice for a number of governments to affix their signatures to it, however large that number may be, unless the provisions contained in that international document become effective, unless they enter into force. That is why we want to see the Treaty on non-proliferation become effective as soon as possible and thus accomplish its underlying purpose. Therefore we would also like to see the largest possible number of States accede to the Treaty, especially the so-called key countries upon which the degree to which the Treaty will be able to function successfully in practice depends to a certain extent. Those countries enjoy positions of importance in the individual regions, both politically and economically. It is understandable that the attention of their neighbours is now centred upon them in the expectation of their next moves. They represent, in a way, points of neuralgia in the denuclearized system created by the non-proliferation

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Treaty. For that reason we associate ourselves fully with the appeal addressed at this session by the representatives of Canada (ENDC/PV.396, para. 51) and other countries to those States which have not yet made up their minds or still hesitate to follow the example of those countries which have already taken the decisive step.

75. I am glad to be able to inform the members of the Committee that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, following the proposal of the Czechoslovak Government, recommended to the Assembly on 20 March 1969 that it give its consent to the ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty. We hope that other signatories will also proceed along these lines so that the required number of ratifications may be secured in the near future.

76. I should like to emphasize with all due seriousness that we, from our viewpoint, shall be able to regard the non-proliferation Treaty as effective only if it covers fully and without any reservations the territory of central Europe, in the heart of which our country lies. We feel encouraged by the fact that similar concern about the European aspects of the application of the non-proliferation Treaty has been expressed in the statements of a number of representatives of both Eastern and Western Europe. We are vitally interested in seeing that region transformed into an area of peace and tranquillity which, instead of being a hotbed of likely conflicts, would become an area of successful progress and fruitful co-operation. That, of course, will become possible only if negative influences are removed, artificially created tensions are relaxed, and steps are taken to settle existing problems in a constructive manner.

77. In our opinion, a practical and highly useful step towards strengthening European security -- as expressed in the joint declaration adopted at the meeting of the members of the Warsaw Treaty in Budapest on 17 March 1969 -- would be to hold a meeting at the earliest possible date of the representatives of all interested European States. The purpose of the meeting would be to decide, on the basis of mutual agreement, on the procedure to be followed in convening a conference on European security and on the agenda of such a conference. This all-European conference would create the necessary prerequisites for a specific dialogue among all European States. It would help to bring about relations among them that would be based on mutual economic, cultural and social co-operation facilitating the full utilization of all sources of human and natural energy in that continent. All this would contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of trust and good neighbourly coexistence.

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78. It is along these lines that we wish to work in Europe and, as stated by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubček,:

"Our Government, diplomacy, representatives of social organizations and culture will in the spirit of this declaration communicate with governments, parliaments, political parties, with all outstanding progressive people, especially in European countries, in regard to the contemporary situation, peace, dangerous trends in the development in Europe and the ways and means of preventing them. We shall be glad to listen to the views and proposals of all European countries."

79. We are convinced that in the efforts aimed at improving the situation in Europe priority should be given to the consideration of some of the important questions relating to disarmament problems. That is why we attach so much importance to the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty precisely in that sensitive region. As we look at it, the Treaty should lead in its consequences to an agreement on the setting up of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe and thus to an appreciable reduction of tension between East and West.

80. When we speak of the necessity and urgency of the application of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its consistent observance, we have in mind primarily the attainment of those objectives which we have sought from the very first moment when negotiations on the Treaty began. We consider it important to continue without unnecessary delay the matter-of-fact consideration of those questions on our provisional agenda whose solution would really contribute substantially to the cessation of the arms race and bring us closer to nuclear disarmament, as required, after all, by article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

81. The statements we have heard at our four previous meetings this session reaffirm fully in this respect the general conclusion we reached last summer, namely, that the questions of nuclear disarmament must receive our primary attention because they represent the core of the whole complex of disarmament problems. In that sphere we regard as being most topical the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and the ban on underground nuclear tests.

82. However, the solution of the problem of a comprehensive test ban has so far encountered the widely known difficulties relating to control problems. As we have stated at a previous stage in our deliberations, we believe that in the case under

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consideration the problem is one of unwillingness to adopt the appropriate political decisions whereby the nuclear great Powers would give up the possibilities of further perfecting their nuclear explosives, rather than a technical problem based on the uncertainty of absolute detection of even the least powerful underground explosion.

83. It is therefore with pleasure that we note that most of the delegations continue to pay undiminished attention to the question of prohibiting all nuclear tests. We feel that this is a sign indicating hopeful prospects for the solution of that problem. Our conviction has been further reaffirmed by today's statement by the leader of the Swedish delegation, who dealt with those problems in detail and analysed their merits. We intend to study carefully the working paper (ENDC/242) as well as the argumentation she presented to us, because they contain much to stimulate our work.

84. It was with satisfaction that we noted the interest expressed by a number of members of our Committee -- in harmony, I must stress, with broad public opinion and opinions expressed also in the United Nations General Assembly -- in the question of banning the use of nuclear weapons. I have no intention of going into details at this stage of our deliberations. I should like only to express my conviction that through that act the consideration of nuclear weapons, as far as their usability within the framework of the normal armaments of the great Powers is concerned, will move on to a different plane in the whole context of political and military-strategic considerations.

85. The balance-of-strength concept, even a nuclear one, cannot be a permanent guarantee of peace and security on this planet. If we are to reach a state of affairs where mutual balancing of strength would be replaced by rational, peaceful settlement of the problems of international relations we should in the first place enforce a fundamental break-through in respect of the approach to nuclear weapons, put them once and for all beyond the limits of the law and despatch them where, thanks to their character, they belong -- into the sphere of a gruesome apocalypse.

86. In the search for a feasible solution concerning the ban on nuclear weapons -- in the first stage at least the ban on their use -- we are willing to consider suitable variants. We are ready to share in an agreement on the optimal formulation and we should be glad if a serious analysis of that question could be made at this year's session of this Committee. In that way we want to reach at last concrete results as far as the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons is concerned. It is our opinion that should such a ban be adopted it would undoubtedly facilitate the consideration of questions concerning quantitative as well as qualitative cuts in the potential of such weapons and the ultimate liquidation of their existence as such.

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87. Although the Czechoslovak delegation puts the nuclear disarmament complex in the first place in the order of urgency of the individual items on our agenda, it does not do so to the extent of neglecting other groups of questions. We should like to see progress wherever it might be accomplished. We accept as our own the statement of the United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, contained in his message to our Committee, in which he said, inter alia:

"I have always regarded the sea-bed and the ocean floor, as I do outer space, as areas which must be excluded from the arms race, which has already engulfed most of the earth." (ENDC/PV.395, para. 4)

We therefore welcome the fact that we have before us a well-conceived document offering a basis for the consideration of the merits of the problem -- I am referring to the document submitted by the Soviet delegation on the very first day of our session, namely, the draft treaty on prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof (ENDC/240). We are aware of the complicated nature of the problem, as well as of the differences of approach to its various aspects on the part of some States. Nevertheless the importance and range of the measure merits our attempting to overcome the initial obstacles by joint efforts aimed at reaching an appropriate agreement.

88. At the same time we do not lose sight of the fact that our ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament under strict international control. We view the over-all demilitarization of the sea-bed as a substantial contribution to the solution of that principal task. After all, what is involved is the exclusion of a vast area -- almost two-thirds of the surface of our planet, as we have heard -- from military competition, from the arena of military preparations. In fact, this is the first possibility of realizing absolute disarmament in such an extended area.

89. We must keep in mind that this medium is not subject to the national sovereignty of any State and that no nuclear weapons are deployed there at present. Moreover, this would be the first time that unrestricted and full control could be applied in keeping with the totality of the solution proposed.

90. It is for all those reasons that we believe we have an opportunity to prove our determination to achieve a true disarmament measure which would exercise a positive

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influence on the solution of complicated questions relating to general and complete disarmament. Nothing stands in the way of our taking up for consideration the submitted text of the draft treaty. For our part we expect that the countries most directly involved will put forward constructive comments making it possible to reach an agreement.

91. In accordance with the established practice in our Committee the Czechoslovak delegation does not want to ignore other suggestions for further measures that are the subject of our deliberations. We have in mind particularly the question of banning chemical and bacteriological weapons. It would be idle to argue at great length what terrible weapons of mass destruction they are. I need only say by way of example that sufficient quantities of a colourless, odourless nerve gas called "G-B" have been stored up in a single country to wipe out the entire world population more than thirty times over.

92. When considering that question we start from the premise that the agreements already existing in that sphere should be observed by all States. This concerns particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which has not yet been acceded to by a number of States. Its universal adoption should, in our opinion, form a component of any effort aimed at the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We expect that substantial help in that respect will be forthcoming in the form of a report from the group of experts on the effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Its conclusions will undoubtedly make it easier for us to reach the desirable result on that question also.

93. Before closing my statement, I should like to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Czechoslovak delegation will do its utmost to contribute to the achievement of concrete and positive results from the Committee's work. We start from the deep conviction that even partial results from the disarmament negotiations, however limited they may be, may help all States in their struggle for a better and happier life by making it possible for nations to exist and engage in creative work without fear of atomic threat, to enjoy their well-deserved inalienable and equal rights, and to share in all the fruits of contemporary progress in science and technology as well as general economic, cultural and social advance.

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The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 399th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M.A. Husain, representative of India.

"The Conference paid tribute to the memory of former President Eisenhower of the United States of America by observing one minute's silence.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

"The delegation of Sweden submitted a working paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/242).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

JUN 27 1969

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

ENDC/PV.399/Corr.1
29 April 1969

ENGLISH ONLY

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 1 April 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

CORRIGENDUM

Page 16, paragraph 53 should read as follows:

53. The Appeal of the Conference of the States-Parties to the Warsaw Pact, issued on 17 March in Budapest, states that

"one of the basic premises of assuring European security is the inviolability of the frontiers existing in Europe, including the frontier on the Odra and the Nysa, as well as of the frontier between the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, the recognition of the fact of existence of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic, giving up by the German Federal Republic of its claims to represent the whole German nation and the renunciation by the German Federal Republic of the possession of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever."1/

